ABSTRACTS

for Stephen Schiffer's two talks

How Vagueness Affects Meaning

I aim, first, to reveal a hitherto unnoticed dilemma concerning vagueness and meaning, and second, to suggest how it might be resolved. The dilemma is that it's arguable that an apparent fact about vagueness, which I call *Penumbral Shift* (the contextual and interpersonal variability of a vague term's penumbra), is incompatible with a widely-held assumption about meaning, which I call Meaning*s* (an expression's having meaning consists in there being some thing that is its meaning). I suggest that Meanings is what has to go, and I sketch why it's not needed to do the semantic work it's thought to be needed to do.

Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism Revisited

Epistemic contextualists claim that their indexical semantics for knowledge reports can be used to solve the problem of skepticism. But their "solution" requires an error theory in addition to their semantics, and in "Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism" I argued that their error theory was incompatible with their semantics. Sixteen years later contextualists are still replying to that objection, but rather than revisit that debate, I will propose a new and bigger problem for them: their response to skepticism about *knowledge* isn't remotely plausible as a response to skepticism about *justified belief*.